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CONSUMER-DRIVEN REFORM OF HIGHER
EDUCATION: A CRITICAL LOOK AT NEW
AMENDMENTS TO THE HIGHER
EDUCATION ACT
Julie Margetta Morgan
I. INTRODUCTION
American higher education is a lot like global warming.
Public policy has come to it too late with too little to matter
much. Thank God we still have capitalism and evolution to
save us.
- Joe Hagy, retired educator (February 15, 2008)
In 1978, Walter C. Hobbs set out to survey the burgeoning
field of regulatory provisions governing higher education. 1 He set
forth a series of questions to be used by scholars to evaluate
regulations imposed by the federal government upon higher
education: ―What are the regulatory agencies seeking to
accomplish? Is that legitimate? Is it wise?‖ and ―What are the
probable consequences (intended or not) for academe? What is,
what can be, and what should be higher education’s response?‖ 2
The federal government’s regulatory power over higher education
has expanded considerably since those questions were penned,

J.D., Boston College. Doctoral candidate, Higher Education, Boston
College Lynch School of Education. I am deeply grateful to Christopher Morgan
and Diana Pullin for thoughtful comments on previous drafts.
1
See Walter C. Hobbs, The Theory of Government Regulation, in
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 1, 5–7 (Walter C. Hobbs
ed., 1978).
2
Id. at 5.
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further emphasizing the need to answer them. 3 This Article revives
Hobbs’ inquiries to examine the consumer-information provisions
of the amendments to the Higher Education Act, focusing in
particular on the goals they seek to accomplish and their potential
impact.4
As Congress began to seriously approach the reauthorization of
the Higher Education Act (HEA) in 2007 and 2008, it faced a
policy landscape that had long been defined by the ongoing
commitments to broadening access to college and making tuition
more affordable, but was significantly altered by some unforeseen
obstacles. 5 One major development was New York Attorney
General Andrew Cuomo’s 2007 investigation into the relationships
between colleges and student loan companies that uncovered the
improper use of incentives to attain ―preferred lender‖ status at
many institutions. 6 The investigation received much public
attention and resulted in further investigation at the federal level,
as well as legislation that cut federal subsidies to lenders. 7 Later in
that same year, the student loan industry took center stage again, as
the mortgage crisis that crippled the housing market bled over into
a ―credit crunch‖ in student lending. 8 Major lenders like Nelnet
scaled back the types of student loans they offer, and others ceased
offering loans altogether, prompting Congress both to provide
relief to lenders and increase the scale of its direct lending
program. 9
3

See, e.g., Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus
Crime Statistics Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2008); Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2008); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2008).
4
See infra Parts II–VIII.
5
See Ami Zusman, Issues Facing Higher Education in the Twenty-first
Century, in AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 109, 109–22
(Philip Altbach, et al., eds., 1999); Kelly Field, Congress Prepares for StudentLoan Crisis, While Declaring It Unlikely, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 28,
2008, at A22; Jonathan Glater, Cuomo Investigates Colleges and Ties to Student
Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, at B6.
6
See Glater, supra note 5.
7
See College Cost Reduction Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat.
784 (2007).
8
See Field, supra note 5.
9
See Paul Basken, Loan-Rescue Plan Has Hidden Costs, Benefits, CHRON.
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These circumstances made affordability a driving factor in new
federal legislation, and also raised concerns about the
trustworthiness of our nation’s colleges when it comes to
safeguarding the financial well-being of students and families.10
This distrust is reflected in the amendments to the HEA (contained
in the Higher Education Opportunity Act) through provisions that
regulate the relationship between financial aid officers and loan
companies, and also in those that force institutions of higher
learning to provide detailed information about the costs and quality
of higher education to students and families. 11 The reauthorization
of the HEA continues to support higher education by providing
financial aid to students, but it also reflects a new strategy:
changing higher education by empowering consumers. 12
The amendments to the HEA purport to ease the financial
burden of college by decreasing the price of higher education and
helping families to plan better to pay for college.13 The methods
for achieving these goals emphasize providing more and better
sources of information about college admissions, cost, financial
aid, and the terms of student loans.14 They include loan
information provisions that have been termed a ―College
Consumer’s Bill of Rights,‖15 as well as plans for a net price
calculator, tuition watch lists, expanded reporting on institutional
characteristics, and incentives to colleges and non-profits to target
cost and admissions information to students and families. 16
HIGHER EDUC., June 6, 2008, at A4; Field, supra note 5.
10
See Paul Fain, Why Colleges Can’t Shake the Feds, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., July 4, 2008, at A3; H. COMM. ON ED. AND LABOR, 110th CONG., THE
COLLEGE OPPORTUNITY AND AFFORDABILITY ACT: THE COLLEGE CONSUMER’S
BILL OF RIGHTS (Feb. 2008), available at http://edlabor.house.gov/
publications/20080207CCBillofRights.pdf [hereinafter COLLEGE CONSUMER’S
BILL OF RIGHTS].
11
See Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, §§ 1001–
1042, 122 Stat. 3078, 3478–90 (2008).
12
See id.
13
See id.
14
See id.
15
See id.; COLLEGE CONSUMER’S BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 10.
16
See Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, § 111,
122 Stat. 3078, 3098 (2008) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1015); College
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Representative Buck McKeon described the House of
Representative’s proposed amendments to the HEA as an effort to
capitalize on market principles at work in higher education: ―Our
principles for reform are based on the idea that by giving good
information to consumers, we can empower them to exert
influence on the marketplace.‖17 The idea that the answer to rising
costs and limited affordability for middle- and low-income
students is a question of manipulating the higher education market
is not a new one.18 In the past, the federal government has
enhanced student choice by providing direct financial aid to
students in the hopes that increased choice would promote
competition in the higher education market, which would increase
efficiency, quality, and affordability. 19 Student aid increases have
affected affordability positively in the sense that low-income
students are able to attend more costly institutions, but aid
increases may have had the unintended negative effect of allowing
the price of higher education to rise unchecked. 20
The position taken in this Article is not that helping consumers
become more informed is inherently bad. Rather, it is the author’s
contention that this policy and rhetorical shift toward solving
problems by ―empowering consumers‖ that has so far succeeded
unchallenged, can be dangerous if its consequences are unknown. 21
Indeed, the responsibility for providing access and affordability is
shifted away from the government and institutions, and is instead

Cost Reduction Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat. 784 (2008).
17
Howard P. McKeon, Real Progress (Finally) on College Affordability,
INSIDE HIGHER ED, Feb. 7, 2008, http://www.insidehighered.com
/views/2008/02/07/mckeon; Press Release, H. Comm. on Ed. and Labor,
McKeon Statement: Conference Report to H.R. 4137, the ―Higher Education
Opportunity Act‖ (July 31, 2008), available at http://republicans.edlabor.
house.gov/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=691.
18
See Larry Leslie & Gary Johnson, The Market Model and Higher
Education, 45 J. HIGHER EDUC. 1, 1–2 (1974).
19
See id. at 6.
20
See Sandy Baum, College Education: Who Can Afford It?, in THE
FINANCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION: THEORY, RESEARCH, POLICY AND PRACTICE
39, 39–52 (Michael B. Paulsen & John C. Smart, eds., 2001).
21
See infra Part VIII.
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placed on students and families. 22 Without any indication that
greater consumer information will in fact lead to better consumer
choices, better access and better affordability, a political rhetoric
that glorifies consumer choice at the expense of much-needed
focus on assisting families in paying for higher education could
hurt students, especially low-income ones. 23
This Article discusses the consumer information sections of the
amendments to the HEA as well as their theoretical basis and
likelihood of success. 24 Section II begins by observing the
historical precedents for federal involvement in higher education
policy. 25 Sections III and IV set the stage for the policy shifts
contained in the HEA reauthorization by highlighting the emerging
educational policy themes of accountability and consumerism and
discussing the key conclusions and recommendations made by
Margaret Spellings’ 2006 Commission on the Future of Higher
Education.26 Section V describes the proposed amendments to the
HEA and their intended effects, gleaned from comments by
leading policymakers.27 Section VI examines the economic
theories that underlie efforts to increase competition in higher
education. 28 Section VII points to analogous attempts to increase
consumer choice in k-12 education and graduate teacher
preparation programs, and the results of those efforts.29
II. THE FEDERAL ROLE IN HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY
In order to understand the goals to be fulfilled through the
consumer information amendments to the HEA and the context
under which they were passed, this section will provide a historical
background of the role of Congress in supporting higher
22

See, e.g., Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315,
§ 111, 122 Stat. 3078, 3098 (2008) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1015).
23
See infra Part VIII.
24
See infra Part V.
25
See infra Part II.
26
See infra Parts III–IV.
27
See infra Part V.
28
See infra Part VI.
29
See infra Part VII.
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education. 30 It is neither practicable nor necessary to detail every
congressional action that has affected higher education. Rather,
highlighting the events that have had the most substantial effect on
the federal role in postsecondary education is sufficient to show
that it evolved incrementally as a response to a variety of
circumstances, and any future policies must work within the
framework set up more out of necessity than long-term planning.
The responsibility to provide for public education has been
traditionally left to the states,31 so the federal government has
always had what could be considered a secondary role in both k-12
and higher education.32 At its core, the relationship remains one
based upon the provision of resources and the expected return of a
myriad of benefits to society. 33 From the inception of the system of
higher education in America, colleges and universities, both public
and private, have received funding from the government, whether
it was from the crown, the colony, the state, or the federal
government.34 Even from the earliest of days, however, the
provision of support has not been purely beneficent; it has served
important federal policy goals. 35
In the 1800s, while American colleges were still in their
infancy, the federal government furthered higher education in its
new states by providing its most readily available asset: land.36
30

See infra text accompanying notes 31–78.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
32
See Lawrence Gladieux & Jacqueline King, The Federal Government
and Higher Education, in AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 151, 152 (Philip Altbach et al. eds., 1999).
33
See JOHN S. BRUBACHER & WILLIS RUDY, HIGHER EDUCATION IN
TRANSITION 219–37 (1997); Robben Fleming, Who Will Be Regulated, and
Why?, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 11, 15 (Walter C.
Hobbs ed., 1978).
34
See GEORGE RAINSFORD, CONGRESS AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 3 (1972); JOHN R. THELIN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
HIGHER EDUCATION 12–13 (2004).
35
See Patrick M. Callan, Reframing Access and Opportunity: Problematic
State and Federal Higher Education Policy in the 1990s, in THE STATES AND
PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY 84 (Donald E. Heller ed., 2001); Fleming,
supra note 33, at 15.
36
BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 33, at 227.
31
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Prior to 1862, grants of land were made without significant
conditions and for the purpose of inciting interest in the purchase
of federally owned land in western territories. 37 The Morrill Land
Grant Act of 1862 changed that; the Act endowed states with land
taken from the public domain for the purpose of establishing and
maintaining colleges, with specific conditions: to teach primarily
agricultural and mechanical arts, and also to provide military
training. 38 The Morrill land grants were a response to
dissatisfaction with the liberal arts education available in America
at the time; legislators recognized that the country’s ability to
compete with the rest of the world depended upon the development
of knowledge in both agricultural and mechanical arenas.39
From the first Morrill Act onward, federal support of higher
education has been conditioned in such a way as to not only assist
in the spread of higher learning, but also to achieve certain other
public policy goals. 40 For instance, the Morrill Act of 1890
extended funding to land grant colleges on a yearly basis, but it
required that institutions receiving funding would not refuse
education based upon race.41 Targeting grants for the development
of agricultural and mechanical fields shows the government’s
intent to shape the course of American higher education so that it
might serve the needs of the country and its citizens for economic
growth, defense, or social wellbeing. 42 The condition that
institutions admit students of all races, however, indicates a
37

See id. Alice Rivlin and George Rainsford indicate that the provision of
land in the late 1700’s and early 1800’s was due to a desire to sell public lands
in new territories quickly, rather than to a desire to promote education. The land
was granted for the establishment of schools, but evidently the hope was that the
schools would help attract settlers to the newly established states. See
RAINSFORD, supra note 34, at 39–54; ALICE M. RIVLIN, THE ROLE OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION 10 (1961).
38
See Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862, 7 U.S.C. § 301 (2008).
39
See BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 33, at 227.
40
See id. at 219–37; Callan, supra note 35, at 84; Fleming, supra note 33,
at 15.
41
See Morrill Land Grant Act of 1890, 7 U.S.C. § 322 (2008). The
education need not be provided in an integrated environment in order to comply
with this provision. See id.
42
See Callan, supra note 35, at 84.
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different kind of goal: the government sought to change its system
of higher education so that it reflected attributes essential to a
democratic society such as equal opportunity for all citizens. 43
The twentieth century brought a more firm commitment by the
federal government to the support of higher education. 44 The
patchwork grants and financial support of the 1800s and early
1900s left open the question of whether federal support could be
expected to continue and how it would be administered.45 The
congressional response to this question was shaped in part by
circumstance and in part by the vigilant protection of the power of
the states to control education, resulting in the establishment of
two major channels of support: research grants and student
financial aid. 46 Financing for research projects began in the late
1800s, but a federal commitment to supporting research in a
university setting, particularly on issues of national defense, arose
out of the military needs of the First and Second World Wars.47
Vannevar Bush’s Science: The Endless Frontier argued
successfully for the continuation of funding for scientific research
in peacetime; today, many of Bush’s suggestions have taken shape
in real organizations that fund higher education research, such as
the National Institute of Health, the National Science Foundation,
and the National Endowment for the Arts, as well as large research
grants from federal departments like the Departments of Defense,
Agriculture, Energy, and Health and Human Services.48
Although targeted research grants satisfied the federal
government’s need to further national objectives like technological
43

See John Thelin, Higher Education and the Public Trough, in PUBLIC
FUNDING OF HIGHER EDUCATION 21, 37 (Edward St. John & Michael Parsons
eds., 2004).
44
See BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 33, at 219; THELIN, supra note 34,
at 32–33.
45
See Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862, 7 U.S.C. § 301 (2008); Morrill
Land Grant Act of 1890, 7 U.S.C. § 322 (2008); Hatch Act of 1887, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 361a–361h (2008).
46
See THELIN, supra note 34, at 23.
47
See id. at 29.
48
See VANNEVAR BUSH, SCIENCE: THE ENDLESS FRONTIER (1945);
CONSTANCE EWING COOK, LOBBYING FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 6–7 (1998);
THELIN, supra note 34, at 32.
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advancement and national defense, they do not address the ―social
goals‖ such as equal access and more equitable distribution of
wealth. 49 President Truman addressed these social goals in 1946 by
convening a commission to examine the feasibility of expanding
educational opportunities to all eligible students. 50 The resulting
report, Higher Education for American Democracy, laid down the
rationale and groundwork for expanding access to higher
education, but failed to provide any roadmap for how Congress or
any other federal branch should facilitate expansion. 51 Colleges
and universities would need substantial financial support to
accommodate the broad access counseled in the Truman
Commission Report, yet it was not clear that this support would
come from the federal government. 52 In order to realize expansion
of opportunity in postsecondary education, Congress would have
to overcome the same constitutional and political objections it had
faced since the 1700s, when President Washington lobbied for the
creation of a national university. 53
Although Congress balked at the idea of expanding federal
support in the 1940s, the political wherewithal to expand
educational opportunity surfaced through changing circumstances
over the next two decades.54 In the mid-1940s, Congress faced the
impending return of World War II veterans and pressure to make a
smooth transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy. 55 To
delay the entry of servicemen into the workforce and give industry
time to recover, legislators created incentives for veterans to take
part in postsecondary education. 56 The Servicemen’s Readjustment
49

See Leslie & Johnson, supra note 18, at 105–06.
See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, HIGHER
EDUCATION FOR AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: VOL. I (1947); THELIN, supra note 34,
at 268.
51
See THELIN, supra note 34, at 269.
52
See id.
53
See U.S. CONST. amend. X; RAINSFORD, supra note 34, at 18–20;
THELIN, supra note 34, at 153–54.
54
See Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219
(1965); BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 33, at 235.
55
See THELIN, supra note 34, at 262–63.
56
See id.
50
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Act (―G.I. Bill‖) gave veterans the opportunity to go to college
tuition-free for a certain period of time at any federally-approved
institution.57 The G.I. Bill introduced the concept of national,
student-centered support for higher education. 58 The key feature of
such a program was that the funds were portable; that is, the
funding traveled with the student to whichever federally-approved
college the student chose.59 Lawmakers expected the response to
the G.I. Bill to be minimal, but in fact, by 1946, more than one
million G.I. Bill students were enrolled in institutions of higher
education. 60 The Russian launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957
lent even more urgency to the cause of supporting higher
education, as policymakers moved toward a program that would
ensure excellence in American production of knowledge with bills
like the National Defense Education Act. 61
The Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965 was the first
comprehensive federal program of financial assistance to colleges
and students.62 It borrowed from the G.I. Bill to create substantial
support for higher education that provided the greatest amount of
individual choice for students, while skirting dissension based
upon impeding colleges’ and universities’ self-determination.63
The central focus of the 1965 HEA was providing aid to
undergraduate students ―of exceptional financial need,‖ in the form
of educational opportunity grants, student loans, work-study
grants, and fellowships for students who intended to become
elementary and secondary school teachers. 64 Like the G.I. Bill, the

57

See Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 346, 58 Stat.
284 (1944).
58
See id.
59
See Pub. L. No. 346; THELIN, supra note 34, at 264.
60
See THELIN, supra note 34, at 263.
61
See Pub. L. No. 346; National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L.
No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580 (1958) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 401–
602); BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 33, at 230.
62
See Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219
(1965).
63
See id.; Clark Kerr, Expanding Access and Changing Missions: The
Federal Role in U.S. Higher Education, 75 EDUC. REC. 27 27–31 (1994).
64
See 79 Stat. at 1233.
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HEA ensures that loans are portable and usable at all eligible
institutions. 65 The other provisions of the 1965 HEA included
support for developing institutions, funding for infrastructure and
training for institutional libraries, as well as various amendments to
the National Defense Education Act.66 The HEA symbolized a
federal commitment to support for higher education beyond those
projects that were in the direct interest of the federal government. 67
It marked the beginning of a legacy of student financial assistance
aimed at providing what the Carnegie Commission termed
―educational justice;‖68 it is a federal role that is not mandated by
the Constitution, but rather by a commitment to democratic
principles of social equality and a recognition that the higher
education system could not accommodate widespread growth
without financial support.69
With the Higher Education Amendments of 1972 and
subsequent amendments, Congress reinforced its commitment to
providing aid to qualified college students as well as to colleges
and universities.70 The current version of the HEA contains
numerous programs designed to support higher education,
including Federal Pell Grants, the TRIO programs, grants to
support study of the sciences and engineering, and programs to
promote international education.71 The HEA has shifted its focus
on financing higher education from grants to loans over the past
forty years; at the same time, it has become more accommodating
to middle-income students, rather than solely aiding students ―of
65

Id.
See, e.g., 79 Stat. at 1224.
67
See BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 33, at 236.
68
CARNEGIE COMMISSION OF HIGHER EDUCATION, THE PURPOSES AND THE
PERFORMANCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: APPROACHING
THE YEAR 2000 29–31 (1973).
69
See 79 Stat. 1219.
70
See Higher Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat.
235 (1972); Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112
Stat. 1581 (2008).
71
See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070(a) (1998), 1022 (2008), 1122 (2008), 1124
(2008); see also History of the Federal TRIO Programs, available at
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/trio/triohistory.html (last visited Mar.
17, 2009).
66
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exceptional financial need.‖72
This brief history of Congress’ involvement in higher
education no doubt leaves out significant pieces of legislation. The
major developments detailed above are nonetheless sufficient to
illustrate the fact that Congress’ approach to funding higher
education has evolved over time by adopting strategies that proved
successful in the past.73 Thus, the HEA borrows the idea of
providing federal funds with strings attached from the Morrill Act,
and it borrows the concept of portable, student-centered funding
from the G.I. Bill. 74
Not only has the development of higher education policy been
incremental and isomorphic, but it has also evolved in response to
pressing governmental and societal needs. As a result, federal
policies have often responded to immediate needs without
contemplation of future ramifications. Although higher education
researchers such as Martin Trow envision expanding access to
higher education from ―elite to mass to universal access,‖75
Congress may not have the ability to provide access for all
students to all levels of higher education.76
When Congress undertook the project of reauthorizing the
HEA, modern policymakers faced the problem of a legacy that
promised access without being able to provide it. Lobbying on
behalf of students, universities and non-profit groups cried out for
increases in the amount of Pell Grants and other forms of student
aid, but these efforts have thus far proved but a drop in the bucket
72

See James C. Hearn, Access to Postsecondary Education: Financing
Equity in an Evolving Context, in THE FINANCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION:
THEORY, RESEARCH, POLICY AND PRACTICE 439, 444–45 (Michael B. Paulsen &
John C. Smart eds., 2001).
73
See supra notes 31–72 and accompanying text.
74
See Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219
(1965).
75
See Martin Trow, Reflections on the Transition from Elite to Mass to
Universal Access: Forms and Phases of Higher Education in Modern Societies
Since WWII, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF HIGHER EDUCATION 243 (James
Forest & Philip Altbach eds., 2006).
76
See Fritz Machlup, The Illusion of Universal Higher Education, in THE
IDEA OF THE MODERN UNIVERSITY 3 (Sidney Hook, Paul Kurtz, & Miro
Todorovich eds., 1974).
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as tuition at some institutions approaches $50,000 annually. 77 The
consumer-driven reforms included in the HEA are likely an
attempt to address the problem of access to higher education
without expending extra funds. The increasingly salient social and
political themes of accountability and consumerism provide even
more support for consumer-driven methods.78
III. ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONSUMERISM
The landscape of higher education policy up to the 21st century
is one with increasing support for, and regulation of, higher
education, particularly in the area of equal access for all students.79
Within that basic landscape, accountability and consumerism
emerged as policy issues both in the university and public policy
contexts. The desire for greater accountability and the increasing
tendency to view students as consumers of higher education are
both driving forces in the amendments to the HEA. 80
Accountability is a buzzword in both higher education and k12 these days, but the trend toward more government oversight of
higher education started as far back as the 1960s.81 According to
Jason Lane, the movement toward accountability was born out of
public frustration with the student disobedience and protests on
campuses during the Vietnam War. 82 Lane describes the rationale
for government oversight in the eyes of the Carnegie Foundation:
―since colleges and universities were serving a public good and
were supported through public funds, they should be held
accountable to the public interest through state governments.‖83
Although much of the oversight of higher education has been at
77

See Paul Basken, Pell-Grant Rise is not Enough, Leaders of Black
Colleges Tell Spellings, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 21, 2007, at A17.
78
See supra Part II.
79
See infra text accompanying notes 80–104.
80
See Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, 122 Stat.
3078 (2008).
81
See Jason Lane, The Spider Web of Oversight: An Analysis of External
Oversight of Higher Education, 78 J. HIGHER EDUC. 615, 618 (2007).
82
See id. at 617–18.
83
Id. at 618.
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the state level and focused on public institutions, the federal
government participates in its share of oversight over both public
and private institutions.84 The most basic level of accountability
required by the federal government is accounting for the proper use
of federal dollars. 85 In recent years, however, accountability has
become more complex; governments now seek to make
universities and colleges accountable not only for their spending,
but also for the quality of ―student outcomes.‖ 86 The extension of
the scope of inquiry from merely the way in which money is spent
to the quality of the outcomes generated by the additional funding
reflects the growing tendency to look at students as consumers of a
product, and at higher education as a product whose quality can be
objectively measured.
Perhaps coincidentally—or perhaps not—the movement
toward consumerism arose during the period after the G.I. Bill,
particularly in the 1960s. 87 The rise of consumerism can be traced
both to changes in the way students approach higher learning and
changes in the way universities undertake the recruitment and
retention of students.88 According to David Riesman, the
traditional, pre-G.I. Bill relationship among professors and
students was characterized by faculty hegemony, but the influx of
non-traditional veteran students set the stage for change. 89 These
students were older, more focused on vocational preparation, and
more willing to question the authority of professors. 90 Around the
same time, student activists changed the relationship between
84

See id. at 618; see also James Fredericks Volkwein & Shaukat Malik,
State Regulation and Administrative Flexibility at Public Universities, 38 RES.
IN HIGHER EDUC.17, 17–19 (1997).
85
See Robert Berdahl & T.R. McConnell, Autonomy and Accountability:
Who Controls Academe?, in AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 71, 78 (Philip Altbach et al. eds., 1999).
86
See Ami Zusman, Issues Facing Higher Education in the Twenty-First
Century, in AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
109, 138 (Philip Altbach et al. eds., 1999).
87
See generally DAVID RIESMAN, ON HIGHER EDUCATION: THE ACADEMIC
ENTERPRISE IN AN ERA OF RISING STUDENT CONSUMERISM (1998).
88
See id.
89
See id.
90
See id.
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students and the administration by leveraging their power as
tuition-payers to force universities to live up to ideals of fairness,
equality and justice.91 Together, both veterans and activist students
challenged the traditional subordination of students to the
academic system. 92
Dropping enrollments also put pressure upon colleges to recruit
students more effectively. One response to this challenge was to
cater to the desires of prospective students in order to entice
enrollees. 93 Martin Trow deduces another source of consumerist
attitudes in the simple fact that the trend toward mass higher
education in recent years made the college diploma an obligatory,
rather than voluntary, credential, creating more options for students
and giving them more choice as to where to attend.94 The sum of
all these circumstantial forces on higher education created a policy
environment in which the relationship between student and college
is increasingly thought of as one in which students are entitled to
choice and value in the asset for which they are paying (the college
degree).
The notion that students need consumer protection measures to
improve their relationships with colleges and universities combines
both the student-consumer metaphor and increased interest in
accountability. 95 According to Joan Stark, the federal investment in
student financial aid in 1965 generated increased attention by
lawmakers in abuses perpetrated by colleges against both students
and the government.96 Partly to protect the federal investment, and
partly to protect students, policymakers instituted a ―truth in
advertising‖ model of regulation to ensure that students received
quality information.
Today, students demand more choice and flexibility from
universities, and institutions are willing to acquiesce.97 When their
91

See id.
See id.
93
See generally RIESMAN, supra note 87.
94
Martin Trow, supra note 75.
95
See JOAN S. STARK, THE MANY FACES OF EDUCATIONAL CONSUMERISM
3 (1977).
96
See id. at 3, 32.
97
See RIESMAN, supra note 87.
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expectations are not met, students and parents do not hesitate to
seek recourse outside the university by appealing to the court
system. A recent example of this can be found at Wheaton College
in Massachusetts, where a parent has filed a lawsuit over the price
of attendance at a study abroad program arranged for students by
the college. 98 Courts have reinforced this consumer mentality by
inferring a contractual relationship between the student and
college, using the academic handbook as the terms of the
agreement.99
The trends toward increased accountability to the federal
government and increasing attention to the student’s role as
consumer both entail a notion of quality that is often overlooked,
but exceedingly problematic. Both legislators and consumers
expect colleges and universities to provide quality educational
opportunities and ―positive‖ outcomes for students.100 Yet the field
of postsecondary education in the United States is so broad and
varied that it is difficult to identify what characteristics define
quality. 101 In the past, the federal government has sidestepped the
issue of quality by requiring states to come up with their own
standards of quality. 102 In the new version of the HEA, Congress
again skirts the issue of quality by providing consumers with
copious information and leaving it up to individuals to make their

98

See Brady v. Wheaton Col., No. 0834-CV-133 (Mass. Dist. Ct. filed Feb.
8, 2008), available at http://www.sutherland.com/file_upload/JamesBradyv
WheatonCollege.pdf; see also Karin Fischer, Tuition Lawsuit Puts Study-Abroad
Practices in the Spotlight, Again, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 22, 2008, at A20.
99
See Jamieson v. Vatterott Educ. Ctr., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1160
(D. Kan. 2007); Harman v. Sullivan Univ. Sys., Inc., No. 03-CV-788-C, 2006
WL 861269, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 2006).
100
See Zusman, supra note 86, at 121–22.
101
See id.
102
See e.g., Higher Education Act of 1965 § 202(d) (last official version at
20 U.S.C. § 1022(d)(1) (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 110-315 § 205, 122
Stat. 3078, 3147 (2008)); Higher Education Act of 1965 § 203(d) (last official
version at 20 U.S.C. § 1023(d)(1) (2006) (consolidated into current 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1022 (2008) by Pub L. No. 110-315 § 201(2), 122 Stat. 3078, 3133 (2008));
U.S. Department of Education, Four Pillars of NCLB, http://www.ed.gov/
nclb/overview/intro/4pillars.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
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own determinations as to quality. 103
The trends identified here—accountability, consumerism, and
consumer protection—bear directly on the new amendments to the
HEA.104 Although these trends came into being in the 1960s and
1970s, they were never more present than they are today: money is
tight, both for governments and families, and value, efficiency, and
choice are on the minds of consumers and policy makers. 105 It took
the influence of Margaret Spellings’ Commission on the Future of
Higher Education to translate these buzzwords into a call to action,
one that set in motion the key provisions of the HEA
amendments.106
IV. THE SPELLINGS COMMISSION REPORT
In 2006, the Department of Education convened a National
Commission on the Future of Higher Education. Often referred to
as the Spellings Commission—named for then-Secretary of
Education Margaret Spellings107—the Commission was charged
with the task of ―developing a comprehensive national strategy for
postsecondary education that will meet the needs of America’s
diverse population and also address the economic and workforce
needs of the country’s future.‖108 One year later, the Commission
released a report that was a call to action for education
policymakers and higher education leadership and proved to be a
harbinger of change in educational policy. 109 The report is marked
103

See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1022(d) (2008), Pub. L. No. 110-315 § 205, 122 Stat.
3078, 3147 (2008).
104
See id.
105
See Zusman, supra note 86, at 137–39.
106
See infra Part IV.
107
A National Dialogue: The Secretary of Education’s Commission on the
Future of Higher Education, http://www.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/
hiedfuture/index.html (last visited July 14, 2008).
108
Press Release, Secretary Spellings Announces New Commission on the
Future of Higher Education (Sept. 19, 2005), available at http://www.ed.gov
/news/pressreleases/2005/09/09192005.html.
109
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, A TEST OF LEADERSHIP:
CHARTING THE FUTURE OF U.S. HIGHER EDUCATION (2006) [hereinafter U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, A TEST OF LEADERSHIP].
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by its focus on the concepts of accountability, costs, quality, and
the role of students as consumers. 110
The Spellings Commission report, released in September 2006,
was both an analysis of the state of higher education and a series of
recommendations for shaping its future.111 The report identified the
primary challenges for higher education, including gaps in access
for minority and low-income students, the increasing cost of
college, and the lack of reliable and clear information about how
colleges and universities do business. 112 The report stated that
access to higher education was limited, particularly for low-income
Americans and minority groups.113 The factors that contributed to
this limitation were ―the complex interplay of inadequate
preparation, lack of information about college opportunities, and
persistent financial barriers.‖ 114
Compounding these obstacles to access, the report stated, were
the rising costs of tuition and the decline of state subsidies. 115 The
Spellings Commission framed the problem of affordability not
simply as a concern for individual students and families, but also
as a concern for the government, because consumers pay only a
portion of the cost of supporting higher education and the rest is
left up to public and private donors.116 The Commission also found
that the financial aid system was too complex and therefore
inadequate to meet the needs of students.117 Regarding existing
measures of accountability, the Commission found that the
information collected was primarily centered on the use of
financial resources and was therefore insufficient to give
110

See Elizabeth Redden, Accountability and the Applicant, INSIDE HIGHER
ED, Sept. 26, 2007, http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/09/26/
information.
111
See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, A TEST OF
LEADERSHIP, supra note 109.
112
See id. at 7–16.
113
Id. at 8–9.
114
Id. at 8.
115
Id. at 10–11.
116
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, A TEST OF LEADERSHIP, supra
note 109, at 10–11.
117
Id. at 12.
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policymakers and students information about the quality of
outcomes which are, in the Commission’s mind, the real measure
of institutional performance. 118
The solution to facing these challenges can be found in the
Commission’s many recommendations, with an emphasis on
accountability. 119 The report stated, ―Every one of our goals, from
improving access and affordability to enhancing quality and
innovation, will be more easily achieved if higher education
institutions embrace and implement serious accountability
measures.‖120 It is apparent from the suggestions made in the
report that the Commission envisioned accountability not just as
reporting to legislators and other policymakers, but also making
information available to the general public. 121 The report called for
wide-ranging information-sharing not only with legislators, but
also with families and students.122 To that end, the Commission
advised the creation of sources of easily searchable and
comparable ―consumer-friendly information‖ on higher
education. 123
The appeal of bringing consumers into the accountability
equation is not readily discernible from the Spellings Commission
report, but one may hazard a guess based purely on logic and past
policies. As discussed in the previous section, federal and state
governments are interested in accounting not only for money spent,
but also for the value added by that money and the effectiveness of
its use as measured by student outcomes. 124 Yet in order to
determine that institutions are spending money well or that the cost
of an education is justified, federal and state governments must
make their expectations clear.125 Historically, the federal
118

See id. at 14–15.
See id. at 21–25.
120
Id. at 21.
121
See id. at 20–21.
122
See id. at 20–21.
123
See id. at 20.
124
See supra Part III and accompanying text.
125
See Douglas Bennett, Assessing Quality in Higher Education, 87
LIBERAL EDUC. at 3 (2001), available at http://www.earlham.edu/~pres/
documents/pdf/01-02-assessingquality-text.pdf.
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government has shied away from setting education standards or
assessing outcomes due to federalism concerns. Even in k-12
education, the federal government skirted the issue of outcomes by
allowing states to set up their own testing and curriculum
standards.126 Although the Spellings Commission identified
―student access, retention, learning and success, educational
costs . . . and productivity‖ as ―benchmarks of institutional
success,‖ it did not set specific standards to measure adequate
learning, access, or costs.127 By relying on consumers to regulate
the cost and quality of higher education, the federal government
can relieve itself of this pressure, as well as avoid the difficulties of
implementation and compliance that would arise at both the state
and institutional level.
The Spellings Commission report raised the issue of combating
rising costs and gaps in enrollment for minorities and low-income
students by expanding measures of accountability. 128 Although a
report commissioned by the Department of Education did not
necessarily have any bearing on the course of action chosen by
Congress, the national attention that the report received likely
helped to raise the profile of its policy recommendations. 129 The
following section describes the changes to the HEA made in the
2008 reauthorization,130 which reflect Congress’ adaptation of the
Spellings Commission’s conclusions about the state of higher
education and the most expedient solutions to its problems. 131

126

See generally No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110,
115 Stat. 1425 (holding states accountable for improving the academic
achievement of students).
127
See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., A TEST OF LEADERSHIP, supra note 109, at
14.
128
See id. at 18–19.
129
See Paul Basken, A Year Later, Spellings Report Still Makes Ripples,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 28, 2007, at A1; Kelly Field, Uncertainty Greets
Report on Colleges by U.S. Panel, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 1, 2006, at A1;
Spellings: Commission Is the Beginning of ‘Long Overdue Reform’, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 6, 2006, at A23.
130
See infra Part V and accompanying text.
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See infra Part V and accompanying text.
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V. NEW AMENDMENTS TO THE HEA
The issues raised by the Spellings Commission report are
echoed in the amendments to the HEA that were passed on August
14, 2008.132 Although it is clear that the primary method of support
for higher education will remain financial, the bill increases
accountability to both the federal government and to the public
through a series of consumer-oriented protections.133 This section
will describe the provisions of the bill and the intended
consequences of them, as articulated by legislators themselves.134
The reauthorization bill, entitled the Higher Education
Opportunity Act, contains several sections that aim to increase the
quality or availability of information to students.135 Sections 110
and 111 of the Higher Education Opportunity Act amend chapter
28, part C of the existing HEA, entitled ―Cost of Higher
Education.‖136 Part C of the Act mandates collection of data in the
―Improvements in Market Information and Public Accountability
in Higher Education‖ program, in which the Commissioner of
Education Statistics collates information on institutional
expenditures, characteristics of student aid recipients, and other
subjects.137 The new sections would augment efforts toward
disseminating information and providing for public accountability
by requiring more reporting and publication of information
regarding college tuition prices. 138
Section 110 of the HEA amendments is titled ―Improved
information concerning the Federal student financial aid
website.‖139 This section generally requires the U.S. Department of
132

See Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, 122 Stat.
3078 (2008) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
133
See, e.g., id. §§ 106, 110–15, 120, 488–90, 122 Stat. at 3090–3305.
134
See infra text accompanying notes 135–85.
135
See Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315 §§ 110–13,
115, 120, 122 Stat. 3078, 3094–117 (2008) (to be codified as amended in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
136
See id. §§ 110–11, 122 Stat. at 3094–107.
137
See id.
138
See id.
139
See id. § 110(a), 122 Stat. at 3094–95 (2008).
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Education to promote use of the federal student financial aid
website (studentaid.ed.gov) by displaying a link to that site from
the Department of Education’s main website and by continual
improvement of the information available on the site and the
dissemination of that information. 140 Section 110 also includes
requirements to provide additional financial aid information
specifically for military members and veterans. 141
Section 111 also looks to improve the availability of
information to students and parents, but it focuses on financial
information. 142 The section requires a variety of lists and
calculators that would allow consumers to get estimates of tuition
and net cost of attendance. The proliferation of lists required under
this section is due to the fact that the legislative compromise
combined the proposals from both the House and Senate rather
than paring down the number of lists.143 As a result, § 111 requires
the Secretary of Education to make available through the College
Navigator (Department of Education’s college search database):
A list of the top five percent of institutions in each
category (four-year public, four-year private non-profit,
four-year private for-profit, two-year public, etc.) whose
tuition and fees are highest for the most recent year;
A list of the top five percent of institutions in each
category whose net prices are the highest for the most
recent year;
A list of the top five percent of institutions in each
category that have had the largest percentage change in
tuition and fees over the most recent three years;
A list of the top five percent of institutions in each
category that have had the largest percentage change in net
price over the most recent three years;
A list of the top ten percent of institutions in each
140

See id.
See id. § 110(b), 122 Stat. at 3095–98.
142
See id. § 111, 122 Stat. at 3097–108.
143
See Doug Lederman, Emerging Higher Ed Act Compromise, INSIDE
HIGHER ED, May 13, 2008, http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/
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category with the lowest tuition and fees for the most recent
year; and
A list of the ten percent of institutions in each category
with the lowest net price for the most recent year. 144
Institutions among the top five percent of increases in tuition
and net price in each category must submit an explanation to the
Secretary of Education as well as a plan for decreasing costs. 145
These explanations will be made public to consumers through an
annual report.146
The ―Net Price Calculator‖ is another innovation contained in
§ 111.147 The Secretary of Education is charged with the task of
creating a net price calculator that will help individuals estimate
the net price of attendance at a particular institution. 148 Net price is
defined as ―the average yearly price actually charged to first-time,
full-time undergraduate students receiving student aid at an
institution of higher education after deducting such aid,‖149 but the
Net Price Calculator should take into account the individual
student’s need-based and merit-based aid ―as much as
practicable.‖150 No later than two years after the Secretary
develops such a calculator, higher education institutions that
receive federal funds for student financial assistance are required
to post a Net Price Calculator on their websites. 151 The bill also
calls for the Secretary of Education to develop a ―Multi-Year
Tuition Calculator‖ that will help parents and students estimate the
cost of tuition over an extended period based upon the annual
percentage change in tuition over the most recent three years. 152
The final major change contained in § 111 is the ―Consumer
Information‖ section, which pertains to the information made
144

Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, § 111, 122
Stat. 3078, 3098 (2008) (to be codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 1015).
145
See id.
146
See id.
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See id.
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available to the public through the College Navigator website. 153
The College Navigator allows users to search for colleges based
upon geographical area, majors, level of degree offered, or
institution type. Users may then compare institutional
characteristics such as student population, tuition and fees,
admissions requirements, and other criteria. 154
The HEA amendments essentially codify the data collection
and dissemination already in use through the College Navigator.155
Some of the data required includes: a statement of institutional
mission; the number of students enrolled disaggregated by
residency, race and ethnicity; degree completion rates; cost of
attendance; average amount of grant-based aid awarded to firsttime, full-time undergraduates; the average amount of federal
student loans provided to undergraduate students; and the
percentage of first-time, full-time undergraduates receiving student
financial assistance.156 One new addition to the College Navigator
will be the availability of a list of institutions that participate in
federal student financial aid programs, including each institution’s
tuition and fees and net price for the three most recent years, as
well as the net price disaggregated by student income. 157
Sections 110 and 111 contain many of the substantive
provisions related to the collection and dissemination of
information, but there are additional substantive provisions
scattered throughout the HEA amendments.158 Most of these
additional provisions are included to provide parents and students

153

See id.
National Center for Education Statistics, College Navigator,
http://nces.ed.gov/collegenavigator (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
155
See Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, § 111, 122
Stat. 3078, 3098 (2008) (to be codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1015);
College Navigator, supra note 154.
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See Higher Education Opportunity Act § 111.
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See id. Student income is divided up into categories: $0–30,000;
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id.
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See id. §§ 434, 435, 488–90, 1021, 1022, 122 Stat. at 3247, 3252, 3293–
3306, 3483, 3488.
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with more and better information about student loans. 159 For
example, § 433 requires lenders to provide borrowers with a
disclosure of the name and address of the lender, the principal
amount of the loan, the amounts of any fees, the loan interest rate,
and a projected monthly payment, as well as several other pieces of
information about repayment.160 Also, § 490 commits the Secretary
of Education to the development of a program of early intervention
and outreach that would provide students and families with ―early
information about financial aid and early estimates of such
students’ eligibility for financial aid from multiple sources.‖161
The sections of the proposed HEA amendments described here
represent only a small portion of the entire bill. 162 The other
sections cover Department of Education oversight of accreditation
agencies, requirements that states maintain their financial support
of higher education, better reporting of the price of textbooks
required for courses, and of course student financial aid. 163 That
said, the programs highlighted here deserve special attention
because they represent a new effort to improve access to higher
education through the dissemination of information about costs and
quality. While this new emphasis is clear in the text of the bill, it is
further buttressed by legislators’ public comments about the bill.164
Representative Buck McKeon wrote an op-ed piece for Inside
Higher Ed that decried ―hyperinflationary‖ college prices and
increasing
taxpayer
contributions
without
adequate
accountability. 165 McKeon claimed that the amendments to the
HEA would remedy this with ―strong consumer-driven disclosure

159

See id.
See id. § 433, 122 Stat. at 3247.
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Id. § 490,122 Stat. at 3305.
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See Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315, 122 Stat.
3078 (2008) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
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See generally id.
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See H.R. 4137, 110th Cong. (2008); S. 1642, 110th Cong. (as passed by
Senate, July 24, 2007); infra text accompanying notes 165–78.
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Howard P. McKeon, Real Progress (Finally) on College Affordability,
INSIDE HIGHER ED, Feb. 7, 2008, http://www.insidehighered.com/
views/2008/02/07/mckeon (last visited Oct. 3, 2008).
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and meaningful data comparisons.‖166 Although the availability of
data is not a direct panacea for rising costs, McKeon explains that
he expects that better information will lead to better decisions, and
better decisions will in turn lead to better quality. 167 As a result,
according to McKeon, ―higher education consumers will finally be
given the information they need to start exercising their power in
the marketplace.‖168 McKeon’s op-ed piece stresses the idea that
Congress is stepping up to the plate to deal with the rising costs of
higher education and problems with accountability, but his
description of the bill makes it clear that Congress actually expects
consumers to step up to the plate.169 Rather than directly regulating
cost and quality, based on McKeon’s statements and the text of the
bill, Congress appears to be trying to remove itself from the
regulation of the industry and instead assume the role of facilitator
of better decisions in the marketplace. 170
Buck McKeon’s statements are consistent with those made by
Representative Rubén Hinojosa, Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Higher Education. Representative Hinojosa
identified the goals of the bill as: closing gaps in access and
completion; improving the financial aid system; helping to prepare
low-income and first generation students academically, financially,
and socially for college; and addressing the rising costs of
college. 171 Hinojosa identified the high cost of college education as
the reason for gaps in access and completion, and the answer to
college costs as the provision of public information, as well as
accountability and incentives to states.172
The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions report on the Higher Education Amendments of 2007
166
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170
See generally Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-135,
122 Stat. 3078 (2008) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.); McKeon, supra note 165.
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See 154 CONG. REC. H625, H643 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2008) (statement of
Rep. Hinojosa).
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states that the increase in college costs has made it impossible for
students and parents to plan and save for college and suggests that
increased access to information may remedy this problem. 173 The
report links the inability to afford college without significant
borrowing to a decline in access for some students.174 The report
further states, ―[t]he committee expects [cost and financial aid
information] to help provide students and their parents with a
realistic set of expectations about the cost of postsecondary
education, as well as introduce some incentives for institutions to
control the cost of attendance.‖175 The report clearly shows a desire
to achieve better affordability and better access, but there may be
another goal here as well. 176 The report further states, ―[t]he public
availability of this information is expected to support institutions
and States that are committed to maintaining access to affordable
higher education.‖177 This statement seems to indicate that the
committee envisions the use of the data by the public as a way to
promote competition among universities in such a way that those
providing affordable education will benefit, and those whose prices
are inflated or simply not affordable will find ways to cut costs and
reduce prices. 178
This summary of the amendments to the HEA made through
the Higher Education Opportunity Act shows that several
significant provisions of the Act devote public resources toward
the development of better systems for the dissemination of higher
education information to the public. 179 Much of the information to
be collected and distributed has to do with the cost of a college
education and the financial support available from the federal
government.180 The other information collected and made public
concerns institutional characteristics that might inform a student’s
decision of where to attend, data that bears on what might be
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180

S. REP. NO. 110-231, at 13 (2007).
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 132–78.
See id.
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considered ―institutional quality.‖ 181 Comments made by
legislators during the process of developing the bill make it clear
that they expect the widespread dissemination of information to be
a solution to the rising cost of college. 182 What is interesting is that
it seems the expected effect of the information is twofold. In one
way, it is expected that better information will help families be
better able to plan and save for the payment of college tuition. 183 In
another way, though, it seems expected that by accessing good
information about cost and quality, parents and students will make
better decisions about where to attend, and the aggregation of
many good decisions will ultimately drive down the cost of
college. 184
The provision of better information may seem like a low-cost
strategy with very little risk that has the potential for great reward
in terms of cost-reduction and access to higher education. Yet the
likelihood of success for such a program is unclear, and even more
troubling, its likely effect on access is even less clear. Is it possible
that providing information could make access to higher education
even more unequal? The following section will discuss the
potential implications of providing more information to consumers
of postsecondary education.185
VI. THE MARKET FOR HIGHER EDUCATION
The notion that the higher education arena operates as a market
is almost too obvious to be stated. A market is any situation in
which sellers of a good or service convene with buyers of that
good or service, or an area in which ―buyers and sellers negotiate
the exchange of a well-defined commodity.‖186 However, the
specific functioning of the higher education market is what is
181

See Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-315 § 111, 122
Stat. 3078, 3098 (2008) (to be codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1015).
182
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See S. REP. NO. 110-231, at 13.
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difficult to describe. 187
In a perfectly competitive free market, the price of the services
being sold would be determined between buyer and seller
according to the laws of supply and demand. 188 The fundamental
conditions of a free market are that: no single competitor in the
market is large enough to influence price; the products being sold
by each seller are identical; there are no barriers to entry to, or exit
from, the market; and, all participants in the market possess perfect
knowledge of alternatives, prices and other relevant data.189
Although no market is perfectly competitive, the ideal of the
perfectly competitive market can be used in a predictive context
for real-world situations. 190
Leslie and Johnson argue that higher education policymakers
make decisions using a perfectly competitive model, with the
assumption that their decisions will optimize efficiency and reduce
costs.191 Nevertheless, the market for higher education is far from
this ideal. 192 The market tends to be distinct and different
depending on geographical area, and the product being sold—an
enrollment space—is qualitatively different from college to college
and therefore of unequal desirability to different students. 193 Leslie
and Johnson further point out that although colleges and
universities compete against one another, they do not compete over
price; rather, they set their own prices and compete for students by
adjusting the perceived quality of their product.194
Under these circumstances of imperfect competition,
policymakers nevertheless see incomplete or insufficient
information as the source of the failure of a competitive market
model. 195 Some of the intended consequences of increasing market
187

See id.
See id.
189
See id. at 6.
190
See id. at 8.
191
Id. at 9.
192
See id. at 13–14.
193
Id. at 14.
194
See id.
195
See David Dill, Through Deming’s Eyes: A Cross-National Analysis of
Quality Assurance Policies in Higher Education, 1 QUALITY IN HIGHER EDUC.
188
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competitiveness are better ―value for money‖ and spurring more
innovation; others are better efficiency and quality. 196 Public
policy interventions into the market to create better competition
tend to affect either: 1) the conduct of consumers and suppliers; 2)
the structure of the market, including number and size of suppliers;
or 3) the legal conditions under which the market operates.197 The
public policy tools available to the government correspond to these
three stages of intervention: regulation of price and quantity, as
well as provision of information, may affect how conduct, taxes,
subsidies and quasi-markets are used to modify market structure;
legal adjustments such as anti-trust provisions or changing
intellectual property rights can be used to alter the basic market
conditions. 198
Leslie and Johnson describe the federal government’s interest
in interfering in the higher education market as far back as the
1970’s. 199 They support their claim with evidence from position
papers and policy statements from government officials, 200
including the following quote from a Department of Health,
Education and Welfare document: ―The fundamental premise of
this paper is that a freer play of market forces will best achieve
Federal objectives in post-secondary education . . . . Accordingly,
this paper describes what we should do to give individuals the
general power of choice in the education market place . . . .‖201 It is
evident that Congress’ early endeavors into increasing the power
of student choice centered on ensuring that federal funding was
largely in the form of aid to students, rather than institutions. 202
Dill, Naidoo and Jamieson show that the reliance on market
95, 98 (1995).
196
David Dill, Higher Education Markets and Public Policy, 10 HIGHER
EDUC. POL’Y 167, 172 (1997). See Leslie & Johnson, supra note 18, at 1–2.
197
See Dill, supra note 196.
198
See id. at 172–76.
199
See generally, Leslie & Johnson, supra note 18.
200
See id. at 1 n.1.
201
See id. at 2.
202
See id. at 2; Brian Pusser & Dudley Doane, Public Purpose and Private
Enterprise: The Contemporary Organization of Postsecondary Education,
CHANGE: MAG. HIGHER LEARNING, Sept.–Oct. 2001, at 18, 21.
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forces to cure the ills of higher education is happening all over the
world.203 Although countries like the United Kingdom are
deregulating to a more American model of higher education,
researchers are cautioning against inflated expectations.204 In
particular, the United States’ intention to assist competition by
providing better information to students and parents about
financing and quality may be misguided. 205 The causal chain that
carries better information to changing college prices and quality
entails a long list of assumptions: that accurate measures can be
created and disseminated, that students and parents will use this
information in decision making, and that institutions will react to
students’ enrollment decisions in a positive way. 206
It is easy to see from the research available on the marketplace
for higher education that it is difficult to predict how the market
operates. It is likely that legislators envision the market for higher
education as something approaching a competitive market, and that
they see imperfect information as the barrier to more perfect
competition. Although in theory better information could lead to
better choices and thus more competition among higher education
institutions, this will not happen unless the assumptions mentioned
in the previous paragraph prove to be true. Each of these
assumptions must be researched in order to ascertain whether the
amendments to the HEA contained in the Higher Education
Opportunity Act will achieve the goal of creating better
competition in higher education that will, in turn, reduce costs and
increase quality.

203

See Dill, supra note 196, at 177; Dill, supra note 195, at 99; Rajani
Naidoo & Ian Jamieson, Empowering Participants or Corroding Learning?
Towards a Research Agenda on the Impact of Student Consumerism in Higher
Education, 20 J. EDUC. POL’Y 267, 267–81 (2005).
204
See Naidoo & Jamieson, supra note 203.
205
See Dill, supra note 196, at 180–83; Leslie & Johnson, supra note 186,
at 13–14.
206
See Dill, supra note 196, at 180–83; Leslie & Johnson, supra note 186,
at 13–14.
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VII. OPEN-MARKET PRECEDENTS IN EDUCATION
The recent attempts to marketize higher education have
precedent in both k-12 education policy and in the regulations
governing teacher preparation programs. 207 Scholars who
documented the rhetoric surrounding the move toward
―deregulation‖ closely followed the changing approaches to reform
in each of these areas.208 This section will describe the changes in
both teacher preparation policy and the reforms to k-12 education,
as well as the research on both the process of reform and its
effects.
A. Teacher Preparation Programs
During the 1990s, the federal government took a role in
increasing accountability and quality in teacher preparation
programs through the Goals 2000: Educate America Act of 1996,
the 1994 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act (ESEA), and the 1998 amendments to the HEA. 209
The idea of inspiring a culture of public accountability in teacher
preparation was ushered into the public policy arena by several
public interest groups and a few key legislators.210
Lora Cohen-Vogel and Hyland Hunt examined the way that
policy regarding teacher preparation took shape by observing the
contributions of advocates and politicians. 211 Their analysis creates
a dichotomy among policy advocates, distinguishing those who
advocated for the ―professionalization‖ of teacher preparation
207

See infra text accompanying notes 209–72.
See infra text accompanying notes 209–72.
209
See Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125
(1994) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); Improving America’s
Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6304 (2008); Higher Education
Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1581 (1998) (codified in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
210
See Lora Cohen-Vogel & Hyland Hunt, Governing Quality in Teacher
Education: Deconstructing Federal Text and Talk, 114 AM. J. EDUC. 137, 137–
38 (2007).
211
See id.
208
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through better licensing standards, and those who supported the
deregulation of teaching, emphasizing knowledge of subject matter
content over pedagogical concerns. 212 The teacher preparation
legislation is more or less a compromise between these two points
of view; it is ―deregulation‖ because it does not set federal
standards of quality, but it ―professionalizes‖ by forcing states to
maintain licensing standards and publicize the quality of its
programs.213
The Goals 2000 Act codified as a national goal access to
teacher’s education programs that allow teachers to ―acquire the
knowledge and skills needed to instruct and prepare all American
students for the next century.‖214 The 1994 reauthorization of the
ESEA followed through on this goal by providing support to
teacher education program through additional funding.215
Congress’ next step into the field of teacher preparation was the
most intrusive; the 1998 Higher Education Act Amendments
require reporting both by states and individual institutions that
amounts to accountability to both the legislature and the general
public.216
The 1998 amendments offer grants to states and institutions to
improve the quality of teacher education programs. 217 The statutes
do not clearly define standards of quality, but rather call upon
states and institutions to prepare teachers who are ―highly
competent in their academic content areas in which [they] plan to
teach.‖218 They also emphasize state-level certification

212

Id.
See Goals 2000: Educate America Act; Improving America’s Schools
Act of 1994 §§ 6301–04; Higher Education Amendments of 1998.
214
See Goals 2000: Educate America Act,
215
See Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994 §§ 6301–04.
216
See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112
Stat. 1581, 1759 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
217
See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, 112 Stat. at 1623.
218
See, e.g., Higher Education Act of 1965, § 202(d) (last official version
at 20 U.S.C. § 1022(d)(1) (2006)) (amended by Pub. L. No. 110-314 § 205, 122
Stat. 3078, 3147 (2008); Higher Education Act of 1965 § 203(d) (last official
version at 20 U.S.C. § 1023(d)(1) (2006) (consolidated into current 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1022 (2008) by Pub. L. No. 110-315 § 201(2), 122 Stat. 3078, 3133) (2008)).
213
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requirements, clinical experience, and professional development.219
The provisions offering grants are immediately followed by
requirements of accountability. 220 To that end, Congress requires
both states and institutions to submit report cards on the quality of
teacher preparation.221
Although states and individual institutions are required to
submit ―report cards‖ to the Department of Education, so far only
the institutional report cards must be made readily available to the
general public.222 The only portion of state report cards that is
required by law to be widely publicized is the percentage of
teacher candidates who passed the state assessments, disaggregated
and ranked by the students’ preparation program. 223 The other state
report card components, including a description of teacher
licensing or certification requirements, the standards a teachercandidate must meet to pass certification or licensing requirements,
and the alignment of the certification or licensing program with the
state’s standards for students must be reported to the Secretary of
Education.224
The institutional report cards must include the percentage of
the teacher preparation program’s students who passed the
institution’s resident state licensing or certification exam within
three years of completing the teacher preparation program, and a
comparison of its pass rate with the average pass rates of other
programs in the state.225 It also must provide a general description
of the teacher preparation program, including the number of
students enrolled, the hours of practicum experience required and
the faculty-student ratio in the practicum experience, as well as a
statement as to whether the program is accredited. The institutions
also must publicize whether or not they have been designated as
219

See generally Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105244, 112 Stat. 1581 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
220
See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, 112 Stat. at 1759
(reauthorizing the Higher Education Act of 1965, omitted 2009).
221
See id.
222
See id.
223
See id.
224
See id.
225
See id.
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―low-performing‖ according to standards set by the states in
accordance with another provision of the HEA. 226
The amendments to the HEA substantially changed the way
that teacher preparation programs are accountable to both the
federal government and the general public. 227 Now, one can search
the Internet and find the institutional report cards of a wide array of
teacher preparation programs.228 The Secretary of Education’s
Annual Report on Teacher Quality documents the gains in quality
in teacher preparation programs, but it does not differentiate
among the potential causes of these gains. 229 Neither that report
nor any scholarly research shows whether public information about
the quality of teacher preparation programs is used by applicants
and whether it has had an effect on their decisions as to where to
apply. 230
B. No Child Left Behind
The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB)—a comprehensive
education reform undertaken in 2001—has received much
attention from the public and from education policymakers and
practitioners. The Act is a mammoth piece of legislation that
reauthorizes federal programs promoting primary and secondary
education found in the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act.231 The revolutionary elements of NCLB are measures of
accountability and free choice that force states to evaluate the
educational preparation of their students, and give parents more
options for choosing where their children will be educated.232
The U.S. Department of Education states that No Child Left
Behind is based upon four ―pillars‖: stronger accountability, more
226

See id.
See id.
228
Id.
229
See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THE SECRETARY’S
FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT ON TEACHER QUALITY: A HIGHLY QUALIFIED TEACHER
IN EVERY CLASSROOM (2006).
230
Id.
231
See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–6304 (2008).
232
See id.
227
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freedom for states and communities, proven education methods,
and more choice for parents.233 Stronger accountability is achieved
by requiring states to develop standards for academic content areas
and use standardized tests to gauge how learning measures up to
these standards.234 Accountability is also furthered by creating
state and district ―report cards‖ that are not only made public, but
also used to enforce penalties on under-performing districts.235
Freedom for states and communities is encouraged by allowing
states to redirect federal funds from one program to another.236
The Act purports to promote ―proven education methods‖ by
requiring that states implement programs and assessment methods
that are proven through ―scientifically based research.‖ 237 The final
pillar, more choice for parents, is supported by allowing parents of
children in low-performing schools to transfer their children to
better performing schools in the district or to public charter
schools.238 Some parents in low-performing districts are also
eligible for supplemental educational services.239 In all, the
measures supporting the four pillars of NCLB encourage
accountability to the state and federal governments, accountability
to the public through the provision of information, and greater
school choice for parents.240
These measures of accountability and choice are part of the
theme underlying the Act that public education may be improved
by decentralized accountability coupled with competition. 241 It
233

U.S. Department of Education, Four Pillars of NCLB,
http://www.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/4pillars.html (last visited July 14, 2008).
234
See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–110, § 1111
(2001).
235
See U.S. Department of Education, supra note 233.
236
See id.
237
See 20 U.S.C. § 6314.
238
See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b).
239
See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(e).
240
See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6314, 6316(b), 6316(e); U.S. Department of
Education, supra note 233.
241
See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–04; Andrew Rudalevige, No Child Left Behind:
Forging a Congressional Compromise, in NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND? THE
POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 23, 24 (Paul Peterson &
Martin West, eds., 2003).
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may seem odd to think of public schools, school districts, and
states as competitors, but in fact they do compete. 242 Public schools
do not necessarily have a monopoly on their district; they compete
with public charter schools and private schools for students.243
Students are not the only resource in short supply; districts and
states also compete for money in the form of government grants or
higher property taxes.244
The stated purpose of NCLB is ―to ensure that all children have
a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality
education . . . .‖245 How was it decided that increasing choice and
accountability would meet this goal? The ―checks and balances‖ of
the legislative and executive branches and the adversarial twoparty system at work in Congress do not lend themselves to
creating policy based upon a unified ideology.246 Rather, the
ideology evident in NCLB is the product of legislative
compromise. 247 In the years leading up to its enactment,
Republicans and Democrats differed markedly in terms of their
approaches to education reform.248 Andrew Rotherham of the
Progressive Policy Institute described the heart of these differences
as ―the left’s habitual demand for more spending and the right’s
incessant campaign to shrink Washington’s role in education.‖ 249
242

Dennis Epple & Richard E. Romano, Competition Between Private and
Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 33–34
(1998); George M. Holmes et al., Does School Choice Increase School Quality?,
2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9683, 2003).
243
See Epple & Romano, supra note 242, at 33; Holmes et al., supra note
242, at 2.
244
See Holmes et al., supra note 242, at 1.
245
20 U.S.C. § 6301.
246
See generally David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Divided
Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and
Empirical Test, 58 J. POL. 373 (1996).
247
See Rudalevige, supra note 241.
248
See ELIZABETH H. DEBRAY, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY, AND EDUCATION:
FEDERAL POLICY DURING THE CLINTON AND BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS 27–37
(2006).
249
ANDREW ROTHERHAM, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE, TOWARD
PERFORMANCE-BASED
FEDERAL
EDUCATION
FUNDING
(1999),
http://www.ppionline.org/documents/ESEA.pdf.
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In the 106th Congress, House Republicans introduced
Academic Achievement for All (The Straight A’s Act). This Act
would provide unprecedented freedom for states by giving them
the option to distribute federal education funds across programs as
they saw fit; in exchange for flexibility, the states would have to
meet higher accountability standards.250 Meanwhile, Democratic
Representative George Miller was advocating better accountability
by forcing states to use the disaggregated student data they collect
as a basis for accountability frameworks; similar accountability
proposals were made in the Senate.251 No Child Left Behind
reflects a compromise between these disparate points of view; the
Act increases accountability, but limits the federal role by forcing
states to set their own standards and placing some of the burden of
monitoring school progress on the public. 252 It is out of this spirit
of compromise, rather than any indication of feasibility, that
Congress came to rely upon open market forces as a major factor
in education reform. 253
After seven years of No Child Left Behind, researchers have
only just begun to gauge the effectiveness of its provisions. 254 The
effects of No Child Left Behind may be instructive for evaluating
the future of the higher education policies that rely on market
competition and which are the focus of this review. The majority
of the existing research has been on how academic achievement
has been affected by state accountability requirements.255 This
250

H.R. 2300, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999).
See DEBRAY, supra note 248, at 47–48.
252
See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2001).
253
See DEBRAY, supra note 248, at 92–110.
254
See, e.g., Justine S. Hastings & Jeffrey M. Weinstein, Information,
School Choice, and Academic Achievement: Evidence from Two Experiments,
2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13623, 2007).
255
See, e.g., Julian R. Betts & Anne Danenberg, The Effects of
Accountability in California, in NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND? THE POLITICS AND
PRACTICE OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 197 (Paul Peterson & Martin West,
eds., 2003); Martin Carnoy & Susanna Loeb, Does External Accountability
Affect Student Outcomes? A Cross-State Analysis, 24 EDUC. EVALUATION &
POL’Y ANALYSIS 305, 305–06 (2002); Eric Hanushek & Margaret Raymond,
Does School Accountability Lead to Improved Student Performance, 24 J. OF
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297, 297–99 (2005) [hereinafter Hanushek &
251
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particular area of NCLB does not really rely on market
competition, so it is not all that instructive. 256 Researchers have
found that some state accountability plans have had positive effects
on student achievement, and others have not; but only Figlio and
Rouse give any indication that the improvement is related to
market competition. 257 Their study posited that the motivation to
improve academic achievement at low-performing schools in
Florida was stigma attached with the label of ―failing‖ or ―lowperforming.‖258
A few studies have examined the impact of the increased
choice provided by NCLB on student achievement.259 Jeffrey
Weinstein and Justine Hastings estimate the impact of school
choice provisions and publicizing school performance measures in
the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District.260 That district
employed a school choice plan that allowed all parents to choose
their top three choices.261 After evaluating the schools for NCLB
performance criteria, however, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg district
notified parents of students at poorly performing schools and
allowed them to resubmit their choice forms. 262 Hastings and
Weinstein compared the choices of parents at low-performing
schools before and after notification. 263 They found that 16% of
these parents chose a different school for their child, and they

Raymond, Improved Student Performance]; Eric Hanushek & Margaret
Raymond, The Effect of School Accountability Systems on the Level and
Distribution of Student Achievement, 2 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 406, 407–09 (2004)
[hereinafter Hanushek & Raymond, Student Achievement].
256
See 20 U.S.C. § 6311.
257
See David N. Figlio & Cecilia Elena Rouse, Do Accountability and
Voucher Threats Improve Low-Performing Schools?, J. PUB. ECON., Jan. 2006,
at 239, 253–54; Carnoy & Loeb, supra note 255, at 311–19; Hanushek &
Raymond, Improved Student Performance, supra note 255, at 297, 309–14;
Hanushek & Raymond, Student Achievement, supra note 255, at 406, 411–14 .
258
Figlio & Rouse, supra note 257, at 253–54.
259
See Hastings & Weinstein, supra note 254.
260
See id. at 3.
261
See id.
262
See id.
263
See id.

MORGAN_6-5-09

570

6/6/2009 12:51 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

chose schools that were, on average, higher performing. 264
Furthermore, the study found that students who were admitted to
higher-performing schools than their original school did
significantly better on achievement tests.265
This and similar studies indicate that NCLB notification and
choice requirements can have a positive effect on the achievement
of students who exercise their choice, but they do not address the
question of whether parental choice can have a positive effect on
overall school quality. 266 Caroline Hoxby acknowledges that, in
theory, school choice can increase competitiveness among schools,
rewarding those that have higher achievement per dollar spent.267
Hoxby points out that school choice has long existed in American
public schools, because people choose residential areas based upon
local school districts.268 Charles Tiebout’s model of local public
expenditures states that the choices made by residents influence the
quality and amount of public goods offered by the local
government.269 Hoxby attempts to ascertain the effects of Tiebout
choice in order to shed light on the potential effects of school
reforms that promote choice.270 She concludes that Tiebout choice
appears to raise the productivity of public school districts by
increasing student achievement while also lowering spending. 271
Although not conclusive on this issue, Hoxby’s study indicates that
it is possible that school reforms that increase school choice could
be effective in increasing quality and efficiency. 272
Without evidence that school choice increases the overall
264

See id. at 4.
See Hastings & Weinstein, supra note 254, at 5.
266
See, e.g., Justine Hastings, Thomas Kane & Douglas Staiger,
Preferences and Heterogenous Treatment Effects in a Public School Choice
Lottery 20–23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12145,
2005); Hastings & Weinstein, supra note 254, at 24–25.
267
Caroline Hoxby, Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit
Students and Taxpayers?, AM. ECON. REV., Dec. 2000, at 1209.
268
See id.
269
See id.
270
See id. at 1209–10.
271
See id. at 1236–37.
272
See id. at 1209–10, 1236–37.
265
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quality of public schooling, or that teacher preparation regulations
increase the overall quality of preparation programs, these
examples of the use of open market principles in federal education
policy do not give any indication as to whether the promotion of
market competition will benefit higher education. 273 Still, these
examples indicate that Congress has embraced the philosophy that
competition is good for education, and it is likely that it will
continue to produce policies that will rely upon the consumer’s
awareness of the quality of educational options available. 274
VIII. IMPLICATIONS
The preceding sections have shown that the new amendments
to the HEA mark a departure from Congress’ traditional reliance
on student financial aid to widen access to higher education. 275
Although student financial aid and direct funding to higher
education institutions remain central to the HEA, the new
amendments contain a variety of measures aimed at increasing
access to information about college, particularly about the costs
associated with attendance and the financial aid available to
students and families. 276 These measures serve a multitude of
government objectives. Chief among those are these three. First,
Congress intends to help families gain access to college by making
them more aware of its costs (tuition price and net cost), so that
they can plan and save better to pay for college tuition, and also
apply to institutions that offer better financial aid packages.277
273

See, e.g., Figlio & Rouse, supra note 257; Hanushek & Raymond, supra
note 257; Hastings, Kane, & Staiger, supra note 266; Hastings & Weinstein,
supra note 254; Hoxby, supra note 267; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
supra note 229.
274
See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112
Stat. 1581, 1759 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) (reauthorizing the
Higher Education Act of 1965, omitted 2009); No Child Left Behind Act of
2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–04, 6311–16 (2008).
275
See supra Parts II–VII.
276
See, e.g., Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110315 §§ 110–15, 120, 488–490, 122 Stat. 3078, 3094–111, 3117, 3293–308
(2008) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
277
See id.; S. REP. NO. 110-231, at 13 (2007); 154 CONG. REC. H643 (daily
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Second, policymakers seem to believe that if they provide
information to consumers, consumers will be able to make better
decisions that will ultimately drive the cost of higher education
down by influencing price setting in a competitive market.278
Third, the more expansive information collection and
dissemination included in the amendments to the HEA will be
available to policymakers as well as consumers; legislators will be
able to use the detailed cost and affordability data to make higher
education institutions accountable to Congress as well as the
general public.
Each of these goals is riddled with inherent inconsistencies and
ambiguities. The first goal of increasing access by clearing up
students’ and parents’ uncertainties about the cost of higher
education and its net price after discounting financial aid is
problematic for at least one major reason: no matter how useful the
information is, it is worthless if parents and students do not access
it and fully understand it. Studies of parents’ and students’ access
to information about cost and financial aid are sparse and limited
in scope, but they indicate that parents and students most often rely
upon guidance counselors and publications from specific colleges
or universities for information. 279 Also, these studies show that
higher income families and those in which a parent has attended
ed. Feb 7, 2008) (statement of Rep. Hinojosa).
278
See Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 §§ 110–115, 120, 488–
490, 122 Stat. at 3094–111, 3117, 3293–308; S. REP. NO. 110-231, at 13; 154
CONG. REC. H643 (daily ed. Feb 7, 2008) (statement of Rep. Hinojosa); Howard
P. McKeon, Real Progress (Finally) on College Affordability, INSIDE HIGHER
ED, Feb. 7, 2008, http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2008/02/07/mckeon.
279
See, e.g., LAURA HORN, XIANGLEI CHEN & CHRIS CHAPMAN, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, GETTING READY TO PAY FOR COLLEGE: WHAT
STUDENTS AND THEIR PARENTS KNOW ABOUT THE COST OF COLLEGE TUITION
AND WHAT THEY ARE DOING TO FIND OUT 17–23
(2003); LOUIS G.
TORNATZKY, RICHARD CUTLER, & JONGHO LEE, COLLEGE KNOWLEDGE: WHAT
LATINO PARENTS NEED TO KNOW AND WHY THEY DON’T KNOW IT 11–12
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college are more likely to seek out multiple sources of information
on colleges, whereas lower income or first-generation families
seek only information from ―local‖ sources such as a teacher or
guidance counselor.280
It is unlikely that a large group of college-bound students
currently seek information from the Department of Education, and
it is also unclear whether students and families actually use the
information in the way that Congress anticipated.281 A student
from Brooklyn Friends School in New York said of the U.S.
Department of Education’s College Navigator website, ―It gives
you exactly what you’re looking for, but that might not be what
you’re looking for if you don’t know what you’re looking for.‖282
In order for the cost and financial aid information on the College
Navigator site to be useful, a student or parent must use it to look
up costs at a college, estimate the student’s likelihood to receive
financial assistance in attending that college, and then either decide
to apply to a more affordable college or university, or start a more
effective plan to save for the cost of attendance.283 Of course, the
estimated net costs and financial aid packages predicted using net
cost calculators could prove to be inaccurate based upon family
circumstances such as additional children in college or existing
assets; this would make it impracticable to change one’s saving
strategy based on the federal government’s prediction. 284
Moreover, existing research indicates that families are more likely
to access this information during the last few years of high school,
280

See id.
See id. See also HORN, CHEN & CHAPMAN, supra note 279, at 22–32;
Eric Grodsky & Melanie Jones, Real and Imagined Barriers to College Entry:
Perceptions of Cost, 36 SOC. SCI. RES. 745, 754–60 (2007).
282
Samantha Stainburn, The College Info Fest, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2008,
§ 7, at 4 (quoting Ryan Ladoceur).
283
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on S. 1642, S. REP. NO. 110-231, at 13 (2007); 154 CONG. REC. H643 (daily ed.
Feb. 7, 2008) (statement of Rep. Ruben Hinojosa); Howard P. McKeon, Real
Progress (Finally) on College Affordability, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Feb. 7, 2008,
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2008/02/07/mckeon.
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at which point it would be too late to accrue any significant savings
to pay for college. 285
The second congressional goal of curbing rising tuition prices
by helping consumers make better decisions is equally
problematic. The circumstances that must come to pass in order to
achieve an effect on the price of tuition are complicated. Not only
must consumers consult and understand the information distributed
by the federal government, but they must also use it to make
―good‖ decisions about where to apply and attend. 286 A ―good‖
decision presumably is based on more than merely the sticker price
or net price of attendance. Rather, better decisions about where to
attend would involve some measure of quality, weighed against the
price of attendance;287 that is, which institution gives the best value
for the dollar?
Although Congress intends to produce plenty of information
about cost, as discussed in previous sections, its work to improve
information on quality is lacking. 288 The College Navigator hosts a
variety of data about college characteristics from graduation rates
to enrollment statistics and majors, and the amendments add to that
measures of quality such as student-faculty ratio and average SAT
and ACT scores.289 Yet they do not include other relevant
measures, such as job placement rates of graduates, average
income of graduates, or measures of the quality of academic
285
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programs.290 And while independent ranking organizations such as
U.S. News and World Report attempt to provide consumers with
measures of quality, their methods have been criticized for serious
flaws. 291 If Congress balks at the idea of dictating measures to
assess quality in higher education, and other sources of information
about quality are insufficient, consumers are left with inadequate
means to make better-informed financial decisions about where to
attend because they lack the resources to accurately ascertain the
quality-cost tradeoffs that are inherent in choosing an affordable
college.
The third and final goal of promoting the use of cost and
financial aid information is the internal use of such data by
policymakers to evaluate the efficacy of federal programs to
reduce educational costs.292 Extensive data on tuition prices and
the net cost of higher education may be helpful for serving this
purpose, but fulfilling this goal may compromise others. It seems
unlikely that the information a policymaker might need to
determine whether colleges and universities are using federal
dollars efficiently is the same that a consumer would need to select
an appropriate college.
IX. CONCLUSION
Walter Hobbs’ evaluation criteria for federal higher education
policy served as the starting point for this discussion of the

290

See Higher Education Opportunity Act §§ 106, 110–15, 120, 488–90,
122 Stat. at 3078, 3094–111, 3117, 3293–308; College Navigator Home Page,
http://nces.ed.gov/collegenavigator (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
291
See Ronald C. Ehrenberg, Method or Madness? Inside the U.S. News &
World Report College Rankings, J. C. ADMISSION, Fall 2005, at 29–35; Don
Hossler, The Problem with College Rankings, ABOUT CAMPUS, Mar./Apr. 2000,
at 20–24; Best Colleges – US News and World Report,
http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/college. Research has shown
that the U.S. News and World Report rankings are heavily based upon
institutional reputation rather than academic outcomes, and critics have pointed
out that colleges and universities may manipulate their rankings further by
modifying acceptance rates, admissions rates, and other factors. See id.
292
See supra Part V.

MORGAN_6-5-09

576

6/6/2009 12:51 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

consumer information provisions of the HEA. 293 Hobbs stated that
one must uncover the goals of a particular government regulation
and evaluate whether those goals are legitimate and wise. Further,
one must determine the probable consequences of such federal
action. 294 The Higher Education Opportunity Act amended the
HEA by increasing the amount of information available to the
public regarding higher education, particularly in terms of the
sticker price and net price of higher education, as well as available
financial aid. 295 It is clear from both the evolution of federal higher
education policy and the contents of the bill itself that the goals
Congress seeks to accomplish are many, including greater access
to higher education, alleviation of pressure to provide financial
assistance (by both reducing tuition prices and helping families
save and better plan to pay), and accountability for the use of
federal funds. 296
It seems that these goals are all, to some extent, legitimate and
wise, owing to their relationship to the democratic aims of social
equality and wealth distribution. 297 However, the consequences of
supplying more cost and financial aid information to the public are
entirely unclear.298 Neither the limited theoretical understanding of
the operation of market principles in higher education nor the
examples of market-based reform in k-12 and teacher preparation
programs can predict whether better information will lead to better
decision-making by students and parents.299 Congress cannot
predict whether students and parents will use greater access to cost
and financial aid information at all; moreover, it cannot predict
whether they will use such information to plan and save more
effectively, or to make better choices about where to apply. 300
293
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Also, there is no evidence to indicate whether the aggregate of
individual decisions to attend lower-cost higher-quality institutions
will actually result in changes in college tuition prices.301
Obviously, it is unclear whether the consumer information
provisions of the Higher Education Opportunity Act will achieve
their intended goals. What is even more troubling, however, is the
prospect that they may have unintended negative consequences.
Social science research indicates that the new amendments to the
HEA may serve to benefit only those people who are equipped to
interpret the information that the federal government provides—
namely, high-income families and those families in which a parent
has attended college. 302 Congress purports to close the gaps in
access that plague American higher education with this new
legislation, but it may in fact only serve to widen the gap by giving
some groups access to ―inside‖ information on institutions that
offer high-quality education at more affordable prices.303
In order to fully understand the value and consequences of the
information provisions in the Higher Education Opportunity Act,
patterns in parents’ and students’ use of cost and financial aid
information must be investigated. At this point, there is no
evidence to suggest that the information provisions contained in
the Higher Education Opportunity Act will be either helpful or
harmful. 304 As the U.S. Department of Education struggles to
comply with the informational mandates set forth by Congress, it is
important to develop research and data that will answer the
uncertainties identified in this Article: Who accesses cost and
financial aid information supplied by the U.S. Department of
Education? How do they use it? Do the choices made by college
supra note 271, at 138; Grodsky & Jones, supra note 281, at 754–60;
McDonough & Calderone, supra note 279, at 1704–05.
301
See supra Part VI.
302
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303
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304
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consumers affect the price of services offered by colleges? Do
consumers’ choices affect the quality of services offered? A clearer
picture of how and whether financial information about college
access is used can inform the process of HEA implementation, and
it can also shape future legislation that seeks to enhance college
access.

